BEFORE THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of Enforcement Action Against

NO. 03-147

Marilou Rickert,

PREHEARING MEMORANDUM

Respondent.

COMES NOW the Public Disclosure Commission Staff, by and through its attorneys of record, CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE, Attorney General and LINDA A. DALTON, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and submits this prehearing memorandum.

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 19, 2002, the Public Disclosure Commission staff received a complaint against the Respondent, Marilou Rickert (Rickert) alleging that she violated RCW 42.17.530(1) by making a false statement of material fact against her opponent in the 2002 election, Tim Sheldon (Sheldon).

Following an investigation, staff charged Ms. Rickert with violating RCW 42.17.530(1) because of one statement she made in her political advertisement that was mailed shortly before the November 5, 2002 general election. The sole statement at issue in this case is ". . . (Sheldon) voted to close a facility for the developmentally challenged in his district. . ."

This matter was originally set for May 27, 2003. Following the receipt of a Response from Ms. Rickert to the Notice of Administrative Charges, a prehearing conference was held on May 27, 2003. The hearing in this matter is currently scheduled for July 29, 2003.

2. FACTS

The facts in this case are relatively undisputed. Pursuant to the scheduling order, the parties will submit stipulations as to the facts on July 22, 2003.

The parties agree that Ms. Rickert, was a candidate for the office of State Senator for the 35th Legislative District in 2002. Her opponent, Senator Tim Sheldon, was re-elected on November 5, 2002.

During the course of Ms. Rickert's campaign, she sponsored a mailing to certain constituents in the 35th District. A portion of the mailing is the subject of this enforcement proceeding. The mailing itself was a brochure, around which was wrapped a one letter size page that outlined the differences between Ms. Rickert and Senator Sheldon. It reads, in relevant part, that while a state Senator, Senator Sheldon "voted to close a facility for the developmentally challenged in his district . . ."

Staff determined that this was a false statement for two reasons. First, the vote addressed in the mailing was a vote on the 2002 state budget bill, namely, Senate Bill 6387 and Engrossed Senate Bill 6387. The budget bill eliminated funding for a juvenile rehabilitation facility that was within the 35th District. As to both bills, Senator Sheldon voted against the passage of this bill.

Second, the facility referenced by Ms. Rickert in her mailing is not a facility for "developmentally challenged" persons. It is in fact a facility that housed juvenile felony offenders, Mission Creek Youth Camp.

Ms. Rickert relied upon a single source for this statement in her mailing, i.e., Dave Wood. She took information he provided her following several conversations with her from the end of June of 2002 through October 2002 and made this statement.

3. ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues before the Commission are to determine if this statement in Ms. Rickert's political advertising violates RCW 42.17.530 and if so, what penalty to assess as a result.

4. LEGAL ARGUMENT

RCW 42.17.530(1) required staff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Rickert sponsored "with actual malice" political advertising that contained a false statement of material fact about Senator Sheldon. Actual malice is defined as acting with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statement. RCW 42.17.505.1

The current version of RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) was enacted as a legislative response to the Washington Supreme Court decision in State v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 135 Wn.2d 618 (1998). In the 119 Vote No! Committee case, a plurality of the Court determined that the language of the

¹ In Ms. Rickert's response to the Notice of Administrative Charges, she argues that RCW 42.17.530(1) is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to her. At the May 27, 2003 prehearing conference, the Commission Chair advised the parties that the Commission had no authority to consider any of these arguments and they would not be addressed in the proceeding. See Prehearing Order mailed June 2, 2003. Therefore, Staff will not provide argument on this issue.

COMMISSION STAFF PREHEARING MEMORANDUM

statutory predecessor to the current law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.²

Following this decision, the Washington Legislature reviewed the Court opinion and found that a statute that prohibited sponsoring, with actual malice, false statements of material fact about a candidate other than themselves to be an appropriate exercise of government powers. Out of this decision came the language for the present day version of RCW 42.17.530(1). Ms. Rickert is now charged under the new statute.

A. Burden of Proof

The parties are in agreement that the burden of proof for the Staff is "clear and convincing evidence." RCW 42.17.530(1). The parties also agree that this burden is higher than a mere "preponderance of the evidence." This is where the parties' agreement ends. The evidence presented at the hearing as to each element of the statute will prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Rickert violated the statute.

B. Elements of Charge

In order to prevail, Staff must demonstrate first that Ms. Rickert made a false statement of material fact. Staff must prove that the statement Ms. Rickert made, that Senator Sheldon's vote was 1) a vote to 2) close 3) a facility for 4) the developmentally challenged 5) in his district, was false. And then Staff must prove that this statement was a material fact to this campaign.

i. Falsity

² The Court's decision is widely divided with only three Justices joining in the determination that the former RCW 42.17.530 as applied both to ballot initiatives and candidates is unconstitutional. The two other Justices that form the basis for the majority in this case agreed that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to ballot initiatives but reserved that it may not be so if applied to candidates as is the case before the Commission.

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The statement made by Ms. Rickert about Senator Sheldon's voting record is false on several bases. First, the vote cast by Senator Sheldon that pertains directly to this matter was his vote on the 2002 budget bills, i.e., SB 6387 and ESB 6387. These bills contained the provisions that eliminated all funding for the facility at issue in this case. Had the bills not passed, funding for the facility would have remained in place and the facility open. Senator Sheldon voted against these bills. Therefore, his vote was one to retain funding for the facility.

Next, the facility identified by Ms. Rickert as one for the developmentally challenged is actually one to house criminally convicted juveniles in Washington State. The parties agree that the facility is the Mission Creek Youth Camp, operated by the Department of Social and Health Services, Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration. Ms. Rickert was unfamiliar with this facility before and during her run from the State Senate. She only learned what the true mission of the youth camp was after this complaint was filed against her. She did nothing to learn more about the facility prior to sponsoring her political advertisement than misinterpret what information she obtained from one person about it.

The testimony at hearing will also show that Ms. Rickert got her information about Mission Creek from a lobbyist named David Wood. Mr. Wood is an advocate for the developmentally disabled in Washington. Ms. Rickert relied solely on a few conversations with Mr. Wood and did no verification of the accuracy of what he said or her interpretation of what he said before she made her declarative statement.

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Based on this evidence, Staff will have shown that the statement Ms. Rickert made was false. It is then incumbent on Staff to prove that Ms. Rickert acted with actual malice as defined in the statute.

ii. Materiality

Whether a statement is material to any particular campaign is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. What may be material in one campaign could mean nothing in the next.

Ms. Rickert will testify that during her campaign the issues she wanted to emphasize was altered by the issues that the public considered important. While she remained true to her core values, she also recognized that certain other issues were important to her constituency. That is why when she published her political advertisement within the last few weeks before the election day, she included in the mailing an outline of those critical differences between herself and Senator Sheldon.

Senator Sheldon will also testify about the issues critical to his district. He will agree with Ms. Rickert that amongst those was the issue of state jobs being eliminated and funding for social services being cut. To paint his vote as one that eliminated funding for social services, especially services for the disabled, was particularly important in this race.

Finally, Mr. Wood will testify about the importance of supporting social service funding and that he worked tirelessly to promote spending on these issues.

In this campaign, the evidence will show that funding for social services was indeed material and Ms. Rickert's attempt to cast Senator Sheldon as cutting those services is critical to how a voter might be impacted in their vote.

C. Actual Malice

Actual malice, as used in RCW 42.17.530, is defined in RCW 42.17.505. Actual malice is defined as acting with knowledge of falsity or the reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statement made. The Commission need not resort to any other definition in that the statute provides it. This definition has not been challenged in the past and the Commission itself has applied it in several cases in the past, therefore, it is unnecessary to look to other contexts for interpretation. It is incumbent on the Commission to determine whether the facts in this case lead it to believe that Ms. Rickert recklessly disregarded the facts she asserted.

The Commission has considered cases in the past under the predecessor to RCW 42.17.530 and applied the actual malice standard to them. These cases are directly relevant to this discussion.

First, in *In re Citizens for a Better Redmond/Conklin*, PDC Case No. 92-194, the Commission determined that the political committee acted with actual malice because "they acted in reckless disregard of whether the statements were true when even a brief review of readily available information would have demonstrated that they were false." PDC Case No. 92-194 at 8. In evaluating this claim, the Commission considered the statements made and the limited amount of review of "readily available" information that could have cleared up any falsity. In that case, the Commission ordered a \$2,000 penalty for the multiple violations of RCW 42.17.530.

In In re Eric Robertson, PDC Case No. 95-077, the Commission determined that the Respondent violated RCW 42.17.530 again with actual

malice because he had been told by his opponent on several occasions about her voting record and yet still published the false statements about her.³

At the hearing, Ms. Rickert will testify that all she relied upon for making the statement in this case was a few conversations she had with Mr. Wood and some feelings she had obtained while meeting with various groups about issues in the 35th District. She did not have any knowledge of Mission Creek prior to this race and really only understood its mission once the complaint was filed.

A variety of witnesses will demonstrate the simple steps she could have taken to verify the truth or falsity of the statement she was making. She will acknowledge that she had campaign staff available to do research for her but that she was terribly busy during the requisite time period and did not stop to take what little time it would have taken to verify her words.

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³ The Commission has considered two other false advertising cases but under other provisions of RCW 42.17.530. In *In re Affordable Housing Council*, PDC Case No. 96-101, the Commission determined that the Council had issued a deceptive ad that falsely let the reader believe that one candidate had the endorsement of the King County Council, when in fact such was not the case. The Commission ordered a \$500 penalty for violating RCW 42.17.530. In the only decision under RCW 42.17.530 since the law was rewritten, *In re Cheryl Chow for Mayor Campaign*, PDC Case No. 98-190, the Respondent stipulated to violating RCW 42.17.530 by publishing a campaign brochure that inferred that two individuals she was photographed with endorsed her campaign. She also stipulated to \$1,000 penalty for this behavior.

5. CONCLUSION

At the conclusion of the case, Staff will argue that each element of a case for violation of RCW 42.17.530 has been met. Given this, Staff will request a penalty that reflects the seriousness of Ms. Rickert's action and inaction in this matter.

DATED this 7th day of July, 2003.

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE Attorney General

LINDA & DALTON, WSBA #15467 Senior Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Commission Staff

1	Dated this 7th day of July 2003 at Olympia, Washington.
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